We design a global refunding scheme as a new international approach to address climate change. A global refunding system allows each country to set its carbon emission tax, while aggregate tax revenues are partially refunded to member countries in proportion to the relative emission reductions they achieve within a given period. In a simple model we show that a suitably designed global refunding scheme is self-enforcing and achieves the social global optimum, provided that all countries participate in the GRS.
Introduction
The threat posed by climate change to the well-being of future generations appears to be substantial (see, e.g., Goulder and Pizer forthcoming, Stern 2007 , Nordhaus 2006 , Tol 2006 . Mitigating climate change, however, is a global public good, as each country's efforts to control emissions will benefit all countries in a non-exclusive and non-rival manner. Countries therefore have an incentive to free-ride on other countries' efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The prisoner's dilemma aspect of mitigating climate change and the absence of a supranational authority makes international coordination both crucial and exceptionally difficult to achieve. Countries may either lack the incentive to sign an agreement and benefit from the signatories' abatement efforts or they may have incentives not to comply with promises made in an agreement.
There is a large body of literature addressing the underprovision of international pollution control. At the practical level the Kyoto Protocol, as the first significant international effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, has been criticized for being ineffective (see, e.g., Böhringer and Vogt 2003 , Nordhaus and Boyer 1999 , Schelling 2002 , McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002 , Barrett 2003 . As a consequence, various other approaches to international coordination have been suggested. Aldy et al. (2003) summarize the alternatives, which include an international carbon tax and international technology standards. Recently, Gersbach (2007) has proposed a further alternative for an international agreement by allowing each country to determine its own emission tax while aggregate tax revenues are partially refunded to members in proportion to the relative emission reductions they achieve within a given period. In this paper we design such a global refunding scheme and explore its potential for mitigating climate change.
A considerable body of research has examined the formation of international environmental agreements using game-theoretic models. The main focus of this literature is on the conditions leading to coalition formation through multilateral agreements. Such agreements must be self-enforcing since there is no supranational authority to ensure compliance. Two types of models have been used: two-stage games (Carraro 2000 , Carraro and Siniscalco 1993 , 1998 , Chander and Tulkens 1992 , Hoel 1992 ) and infinitely repeated games (Asheim et al. 2006 , Barrett 1994 , 1999 , 2003 .
The former approach has emphasized that either stable coalitions are small or that the abatement level that can be sustained in larger coalitions is small. The latter approach focuses on renegotiation proof agreements and shows that the allocation of abatement burdens is crucial for the formation of agreements. As in the two-stage game frameworks, it is unlikely that a grand coalition will be formed, and if it is formed it will achieve very little. Moreover, sub-coalitions may be better for their members than the grand coalition, and regional agreements can Pareto-dominate a regime based on a global treaty. A further strand of the literature employs cooperative game theory and applies transfer schemes to treaty-making (see Carraro et al. 2006 for a discussion of this literature and for the design of optimal transfer systems).
In this paper we define a global refunding scheme (GRS) and examine its potential for an international treaty. We consider a simple two-stage model in which each country can freely set national abatement levels by choosing a national tax rate. Participation implies an initial payment and that national abatement taxes are collected in a global fund, which is partially reimbursed in each period to member countries. Each country receives refunds in proportion to its relative emission reductions over the last period.
The fraction of the fund that is not distributed to member countries is invested. This creates a growing incentive for member countries to abate and to stay in the GRS.
We show that a suitably designed GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that compliance with abatement objectives is in the interests of all countries. In fact, provided that all countries join, the GRS induces countries to choose abatement levels that are globally optimal. The intuition is as follows: In setting emission taxes a country balances costs and benefits from emission reductions. On the one hand, by participating in the GRS additional costs, beyond the costs of abatement, arise because member countries cannot use their revenues from emission taxes, as they are collected in the global fund. On the other hand, a member of the GRS benefits from refunds. The core idea of the GRS is to make the latter effect sufficiently strong. This is achieved by: first levying an initial fee such that the global fund starts with a sufficient amount of money and second by making the annual refund of a country proportional to its share in total emission abatement within a particular period. These forces to motivate countries to abate have to be balanced with the need that the remaining fund is sufficiently large for stimulating abatement in subsequent periods, and thus only a part of the wealth accumulated in the fund can be refunded in a particular period.
As we will elaborate in more detail in section 5, the GRS transforms the intertemporal climate policy problem with the lack of compliance incentives into a standard static public goods problem with voluntary participation. The literature on the private provision of public goods suggests several mechanisms to overcome the initial participation problem, which will be discussed in subsection 5.2. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce a simple two-period model.
Net emissions accumulate to an aggregate stock that imposes a negative externality on all countries. In Section 3 we derive the socially optimal and decentralized solutions, which are the benchmarks for the analysis of the global refunding scheme introduced in Section 4. Here we discuss the properties of the global refunding scheme and show that, provided that all countries join, the GRS is self-enforcing and achieves the global optimum. In Section 5 we discuss the participation problem, some institutional and structural assumptions of our model and alternative designs of the GRS. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
We consider a world lasting for two periods, t = 1 and t = 2. There are n identical countries characterized by an emission function E, an abatement cost function C and a damage function D. Throughout the paper countries are indexed by i and j.
Emissions of country i in period t are assumed to equal some "business as usual" emissionsē (i.e., the emissions arising if no abatement effort is undertaken) minus emission abatement a i :
We assume these emissions are caused by a representative firm in each country which faces convex abatement costs:
Each country i individually sets per unit emission taxes τ i t in each period t. Cost minimizing behavior of the representative firm implies that marginal abatement costs equal the emission tax:
Thus, both emissions E and abatement costs C of each country can be expressed in terms of the emission taxes τ i :
, with i = 1, . . . , n , t = 1, 2 .
In period t global emissions, which are the sum of the emissions of all countries, accumulate the stock of greenhouse gases, s t , according to the following equation of motion:
where γ denotes the constant and positive natural decay rate of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.
2 The initial stock of greenhouse gases is denoted by s 0 . Without loss of generality we assume that s 0 = 0. This simplifies further calculations without impacting qualitatively on our results.
The global stock of greenhouse gases in period t, s t , gives rise to strictly increasing and strictly convex damage for each country i:
Finally, countries are assumed to discount outcomes in period t = 2 with the discount factor δ < 1.
Social Optimum and Decentralization
Before we introduce the global refunding scheme (GRS) in the next section, we characterize the global social optimum and the decentralized solution when no international agreement has been reached. As is well known, the latter is inefficient because the emissions of each individual country induce negative externalities on all other countries that an individual country does not take into account when choosing its emission tax.
Both the global social optimum and the decentralized outcome are important benchmarks to evaluate the performance of potential international agreements. While the latter is the outcome which is achieved in the absence of any agreement, the former is the ultimate goal an international agreement seeks to implement. Obviously, any agreement has to outperform the decentralized outcome in order to be seriously considered, and it is the "better", the closer its outcome is to the global social optimum.
Global Social Optimum
Consider a global social planner seeking to maximize global welfare, i.e., seeking to minimize the net present value of the global costs of emission abatement and the sum of national damages stemming from greenhouse gas emissions. The social planner's problem is given as:
subject to equations (6), (4), and τ
We insert equation (4) into equation (6) and obtain the corresponding Lagrangian:
where λ GO t denotes the Langrange multiplier or shadow price for the global stock of greenhouse gases in period t. The first-order conditions for an optimal solution are
where λ GO 3 = 0. Due to the strict convexity of the Lagrangian these necessary conditions are also sufficient for a unique solution. Equation (10b) can be solved by backward induction to yield Inserting equation (11) into equation (10a) yields the 2n necessary and sufficient conditions for the 2n emission taxes τ i t for a global social optimum:
For given t, the right hand side of equation (12) is identical for all i = 1, . . . , n. As a consequence, all countries set the same emission taxes τ t in the global social optimum.
These are given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Global social optimum)
Given the optimization problem (8) subject to equation (6), equation (4), and τ i t ≥ 0 (i = 1, . . . n , t = 1, 2), the optimal emission taxes τ ⋆ t for all countries equal
This yields the following optimal stocks s ⋆ 1 and s ⋆ 2 :
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in the appendix.
The taxes τ ⋆ t and the stocks s ⋆ t in the global social optimum are such that marginal aggregate costs of emission abatement equal marginal aggregate damages from the greenhouse gas stock.
Decentralized Solution
Next we examine a decentralized system where a local planner in each country (e.g., a government) seeks to minimize local costs and damages. We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria when each country chooses its own sequence of emission taxes, which yields the following optimization problem for country i:
The corresponding Lagrangian yields
Again, λ DS t denotes the Lagrange multiplier or shadow price of the stock of greenhouse gases in period t. Hence we derive the following necessary conditions:
with λ DS 3 = 0. Analogously to Section 3.1, these necessary conditions are also sufficient for a unique solution due to the strict convexity of the Lagrangian. By backward induction we obtain the following formula for the shadow price λ DS t :
Inserting equation (18) into equation (17a) yields the 2 necessary and sufficient conditions for the emission taxes τ i t for a local optimum of country i, given the emission taxes τ j t of all other countries:
The set of the necessary and sufficient conditions (19) for all countries i, i.e., the set of emission taxes chosen by all countries in both periods, determines the subgame perfect equilibrium. Again, the right hand side is identical for all countries i and the conditions are linear. As a consequence, all countries set the same equilibrium emission taxesτ t in t = 2 and, by working backwards, also in t = 1, as the following proposition states:
The dynamic game in which each country optimizes (15) subject to equation (6), equation (4), τ i t ≥ 0 (t = 1, 2), and given the behavior of all other countries, has a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, which is given by the following equilibrium emission taxesτ t :
This yields the following equilibrium stocksŝ 1 andŝ 2 :
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the appendix.
From equation (18) we see that in the decentralized outcome the shadow price for the stock of greenhouse gases, λ DS t , only accounts for local damages. In fact, abating emissions in country i induces a positive externality for all other countries j = i both now and in the future, as it reduces the global stock of greenhouse gases and hence the damages in all countries. In the subgame perfect equilibrium, these positive externalities are not taken into account. As a consequence, the shadow prices in the decentralized solution are lower than in the global social optimum. Accordingly, the optimal level of abatement (or emission tax) is higher and the optimal stocks of greenhouse gases are lower in the global social optimum. 
Global Refunding Scheme
We now design a global refunding scheme (GRS). Members are free to choose national emission taxes τ i t but agree to pay an initial fee f i 0 into a global fund. In addition, the emission tax revenues of all countries in all periods are also collected in this fund. In each period t, a fraction (1 − α t ) of the fund's assets is invested and earns interest ρ per period. The remaining fraction α t is reimbursed to the participating countries in proportion to the relative emission reductions they have achieved in this period.
In the following, we analyze the potential of a GRS to mitigate climate change. We proceed as follows. First we explain the rules and the timing of payments and refunds in detail and derive the optimal tax levels for member countries of the GRS. Second,
given that all countries signing the treaty remain in the GRS over its whole lifetime, we show that the GRS can internalize the externalities induced within the member countries. Third, we show that the GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that all countries that have signed the agreement in the first period will also comply with the GRS in the second period. In section 5 we discuss how the initial accession problem can be solved.
Rules and timing of the GRS
The timing of the GRS is illustrated in Figure 1 . At the beginning of period t = 1 countries decide whether to sign the GRS or not. Signing the agreement requires the payment of an initial fee f i 0 , which is transferred to a global fund f 1 . Participating countries set up a central agency (CA) that handles the global refunding scheme. The CA has the right to set the fractions α 1 and α 2 of the funds reimbursed to the member countries in periods t = 1 and t = 2. We assume that the CA acts in the interests of member countries.
4 That is, the CA seeks to set the GRS parameters f i 0 and α t to induce member countries to choose emission taxes internalizing the externalities imposed on other member countries. In formal terms, given the emission taxes of all non-participating countries, the CA seeks to achieve emission taxes among member countries that provide a solution to the optimization problem
The notation i ∈ GRS (i / ∈ GRS) describes the membership status of country i regarding the GRS. Assuming that m 1 ≤ n countries join the GRS in period t = 1 and m 2 ≤ m 1 countries stay in the GRS in period t = 2, the emission taxes among member countries that the CA seeks to implement are given by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Tax goal for GRS members)
Suppose that m 1 countries (i = 1, . . . , m 1 ) join the GRS in period t = 1 and m 2 ≤ m 1 countries (i = 1, . . . , m 2 ) stay in the GRS in period t = 2. Then, given emission taxes imposed by the non-participating countries τ j t (j = m t + 1, . . . , n), the CA seeks to implement the solution of the optimization problem (22) subject to equations (6), (4),
is given by
where T t denotes the sum of the taxes imposed by all non-participating countries in period t, i.e.,
This yields the following stocks s
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the appendix.
Proposition 3 is a straightforward generalization of Proposition 1 for the case that only externalities of member countries are internalized, which can also be seen from the following corollary:
Corollary 1
If all n countries join the GRS in period t = 1 and remain in the GRS in period t = 2 (i.e., m 1 = m 2 = n in Proposition 3), T t = 0 and the CA's taxgoal τ (13) and (14). Given the parameter settings by the CA, countries choose national emission taxes, and participating countries transfer national emission tax revenues to the global fund f 1 .
At the end of period t = 1, the CA reimburses fraction α 1 of the fund f 1 to member countries. Each member country receives a share in proportion to its share of greenhouse gas reductions compared to global greenhouse gas reductions. The remaining fund earns interest ρ and is transferred to the next period's fund f 2 .
At the beginning of period t = 2, member countries decide whether to leave the GRS.
If they do, they lose all claims on payments from the global fund. The CA announces refunding share α 2 , which depends on the number of countries still in the GRS. Again, all countries set national emission tax levels, and member countries transfer emission tax revenues to the global fund. At the end of period t = 2, the CA refunds share α 2 to the member countries according to the refunding rule. If α 2 < 1, the remaining fund (1 − α 2 )f 2 is distributed equally among the member countries by lump-sum transfer.
For the refund r i t that a member country i receives in period t, we assume the following refunding rule:
The refunding formula captures the basic idea of a GRS: the refund a country i receives is proportional to the relative emission reductions it achieves. The assets of the fund f t at the end of period t before repayments are made is given by
For convenience, we assume that interest rate ρ corresponds to discount factor δ, i.e.:
In the following, we investigate the incentives for reducing greenhouse gas emissions created by the GRS in two steps. First we assume that m 1 countries join the GRS in period t = 1 and all m 1 countries decide to stay in the GRS in period t = 2. We show that under these assumptions the GRS can always implement the favored tax goal as described by Proposition 3. Second, we investigate the conditions under which the GRS is self-enforcing, i.e., provided that m 1 countries joined the GRS in period t = 1, no country has an incentive to leave the GRS in period t = 2. Again, we show that the CA can set the GRS parameters in such a way that no country will leave the GRS in period t = 2.
Full Participation Outcome
We assume in this section that m 1 countries join the GRS in period t = 1 and all m 1 countries decide to stay in the GRS in period t = 2 (i.e., m 2 = m 1 ). We will call this the full participation assumption. Given this assumption, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for all participating countries to choose the emission taxes τ
as defined in Proposition 3. In addition, we show that there are initial payments f i 0 and refunding shares α 1 and α 2 ensuring that the tax goal is achieved. For more convenient presentation, we first assume that the refunding share r i t > 0 for all countries i participating in the GRS. We will see ex post that this assumption is verified in the unique (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, assuming that m 1 countries i participate in the global refunding system, each country i solves the following optimization problem, given the choices of the CA and all other countries:
subject to equations (6), (4), (27), and τ i t ≥ 0, t = 1, 2 .
This implies the following Lagrangian:
where λ GRS t denote the Lagrange multipliers or shadow prices of the stock of greenhouse gases s t , and the fund f t is given by equations (27).
The necessary conditions for an optimal solution are ∂L ∂τ
∂L ∂τ
If the Lagrangian is strictly convex (at least in the domain spanned by the first order conditions), these necessary conditions, together with the conditions τ i t ≥ 0 (t = 1, 2), are also sufficient for a unique solution. However, strict convexity of the Lagrangian (30) is not generally guaranteed and may hinge upon the CA's choice of GRS parameters f i 0 and α t . The following proposition establishes that the CA can ensure the strict convexity of the Lagrangian.
Proposition 4 (Strict convexity of the Lagrangian)
Given the maximization problem (29) subject to equations (6), (4), (27), and τ i t ≥ 0 (t = 1, 2), the CA can always set f i 0 such that the resulting Lagrangian (30) is strictly convex.
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The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix.
Intuitively, a high entry fee f i 0 enables the CA to afford high refunds. Therefore, a sufficiently high entry fee assures convexity of the individual countries' maximization problems, as the individual countries compete over these refunds.
We next calculate the equilibrium tax rates. From the necessary conditions (31c) and (31d) we obtain for the shadow prices λ
As all m 1 countries are identical, we focus on symmetric Nash equilibria. Thus, all countries i ∈ GRS set the same emission taxes, i.e., τ i t = τ t ∀ i ∈ GRS. Then inserting equations (32) into conditions (31a) and (31b) yields the following two necessary conditions for country i:
By inserting s t and f t from equations (6) and (27), we derive a system of two quadratic equations in τ 1 and τ 2 , which yields up to four real solutions for the vector (τ 1 , τ 2 ).
If, however, f i 0 is sufficiently high for the Lagrangian to be strictly convex, then the solution is unique (i.e., there is only one real solution with τ t ≥ 0, t = 1, 2). Hence, given the GRS parameters f i 0 and α t announced by the CA, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where all countries choose emission taxes τ 1 and τ 2 determined by the non-negative solutions of the system of equations (33).
The equations (33) state that, for emission tax levels to be optimal, the marginal costs of an additional unit of abatement (right-hand side) have to equal the corresponding marginal benefits (left-hand side) in each period. Compared to the decentralized solution, for members of the GRS arise additional marginal costs, as the emission tax revenues have to be transferred to the global fund. The refunds, however, induce additional marginal benefits. If the additional marginal benefits induced by the GRS outweigh the additional marginal costs, member countries choose emission taxes which exceed the emission taxes of the decentralized solution.
We now turn to the question of how the CA must set the GRS parameters f i 0 and α t in order to achieve the tax goal derived in Proposition 3. For any tax goal τ 1 and τ 2 the CA seeks to implement, the CA has to set the GRS parameters f i 0 and α t such that equations (33) hold. Obviously, (33) is an overdetermined system of equations, as we have only two equations for the three unknown GRS paremeters f 0 i and α t . This implies that the CA has some degree of freedom about how to implement the tax goal.
This degree of freedom is important in two ways. First, it guarantees that the CA can set the policy parameters so that the individual country's optimization problem is strictly convex (see Proposition 4). Second, in the next subsection we consider the conditions under which no country has an incentive to leave the agreement at the beginning of period t = 2. We will see that both convexity and self-enforcement imply minimum levels of the initial fee f i 0 . In the following proposition we show that, for any given f i 0 , the CA can choose α t such that the tax goal is a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium in the dynamic game in which all countries minimize their own costs and damages, given that m 1 countries participate in the GRS in both periods and given the choices of the CA and all other countries.
Proposition 5 (Feasibility of the tax goal under full participation)
Suppose that m 1 countries participate in the GRS in both periods. Then, for any given values of f i 0 , the CA can find feasible parameter values for α t such that the tax goal as given by equations (23) and (25) is supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that the benefits from refunding can be made sufficiently attractive for countries participating in the GRS such that they choose socially desirable tax rates.
The following corollary derives directly from combining the results of Propositions 4 and 5.
Corollary 2
Given the assumptions of Proposition 5, the CA can find parameter values f i 0 , α t and Θ t such that the tax goal as given by equations (23) and (25) is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
The proof of Corollary 2 is given in the appendix.
Thus, under the assumption that m 1 countries participate in the GRS in both periods, the CA can set the GRS parameters f i 0 and α t such that all countries choose emission taxes equivalent to the tax goal of the CA. First, the CA has to set f i 0 in such a way as to ensure convexity of the Lagrangian. Then, the α t which support the tax goal of the CA as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium are unambiguously determined by equations (33).
In the next subsection we relax the assumption that all countries will stay in the GRS in the second period per definitionem and investigate the conditions under which countries voluntarily choose to remain in the GRS.
Self-enforcement of the GRS
Now we turn to the conditions under which the GRS is self-enforcing, i.e., given that m 1 countries joined the GRS in period t = 1, no country has an incentive to leave the GRS at the beginning of period t = 2.
To discuss this participation constraint at the beginning of period 2, we examine the consequence of n − m 2 countries i = m 2 + 1, . . . , n not taking part in the GRS in period t = 2, where m 2 ≤ m 1 and m 1 − m 2 is the number of countries leaving the GRS at the beginning of period t = 2. Suppose that each country i = m 2 + 1, . . . , n that does not participate in the GRS in period t = 2 only minimizes its own costs and damages.
5 In other words, they solve the following optimization problem :
According to equation (6) the stock s 2 of greenhouse gases depends on the stock s 1 of the former period, the emissions of countries i = m 2 + 1, . . . , n, and the emissions of all other countries j = i. The countries j = 1, . . . , m 2 are assumed to remain in the GRS, and the CA will set α 2 in their interests. That is, the CA's tax goal is the tax
that minimizes the costs and damages of all member countries of the GRS, given the emission taxes of all non-participating countries. Suppose that m 1 countries joined the GRS in period t = 1 and the implemented tax goal in the first period equaled tax
as given by equation (23a). Then the CA's tax goal in period t = 2, according to Proposition 3, is given by
where
is the sum of the emission taxes of the countries not participating in the GRS in period t = 2.
Analogously to the previous subsection, the following proposition establishes that the CA can implement the tax goal as defined in equations (35) by the appropriate choice of the GRS parameter α 2 as the unique Nash equilibrium of the game in period t = 2, in which all countries i (i = 1, . . . , m 2 ), given τ j 2 (j = m 2 + 1, . . . , n) and α 2 , solve the optimization problem
subject to equations (6), (4), (27), and τ
Proposition 6 (Feasibility of the tax goal in period t = 2)
Suppose that m 2 countries participate in the GRS in period t = 2. Then, for any given values of f i 0 , the CA can find parameter values for α 2 such that the tax goal as given by equations (35a) and (35b) is supported as a Nash equilibrium. If, in addition, the minimization problems of all countries i are convex, the tax goal is the unique Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the appendix.
Given that the CA implements the optimal tax goal τ
T G 2
for member countries of the GRS, the emission taxes for the member countries and the emission taxes for the countries j = m 2 + 1, . . . , n not participating in the GRS in period t = 2 is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 7 (Nash equilibrium in period t = 2) Suppose that m 1 countries join the GRS in period t = 1, m 2 countries stay in the GRS in period t = 2, and the CA successfully implements the optimal tax goal for member countries of the GRS in both periods. Then the emission taxes τ GRS 2 of the countries not participating in the GRS and the emission taxes τ GRS 2 of the countries staying in the GRS are given by
For the stock s 2 (m 2 ) of greenhouse gases this implies
The proof of Proposition 7 is given in the appendix.
Having established the outcome in period t = 2 if m 1 − m 2 countries leave the GRS in period t = 2, we can now turn to the question of what condition makes it beneficial for a country i to leave the GRS. Assuming that all countries act in their own interests, a country i will leave the GRS in period t = 2 if the costs C GRS (m 2 − 1) of leaving the GRS, given by
are smaller than the costs of staying in the GRS, C GRS (m 2 ):
Denoting the cost difference between staying in the GRS and leaving the GRS, given that m 2 countries stay in the GRS, by ∆C(m 2 )
country i will leave the GRS if ∆C(m 2 ) ≥ 0.
In the following proposition we show that the GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that for all m 2 = 1, . . . , n the CA can set f i 0 such that ∆C(m 2 ) < 0 and so no country has an incentive to leave the GRS in period t = 2.
Proposition 8 (Self-enforcement of the GRS)
Suppose that m 2 countries are members of the GRS at the beginning of period t = 2, a member country i will leave the GRS in period t = 2 if ∆C(m 2 ) ≥ 0, and countries leaving the GRS minimize (34) subject to equations (6), (4), (35), and τ j 2 ≥ 0 (j / ∈ GRS). Then the CA can set the initial fee f i 0 such that no country will leave the GRS in period t = 2.
The proof of Proposition 8 is given in the appendix.
Proposition 8 says that the CA can always set f i 0 so that there is no incentive for any country to leave the GRS, which implies that all countries will remain in the GRS. Accordingly, the GRS is self-enforcing. Intuitively, the higher is the initial fee f i 0 the more countries have to loose by leaving the GRS in the beginning of period 2, in which case they would loose all claims to the remaining fund.
In summary, we have shown that for any number of countries m 1 joining the GRS in period t = 1 a self-enforcing GRS can be designed such that the tax goal as given by Proposition 3 is achieved for both periods. If all countries join the GRS in period t = 1 (i.e., m 1 = n), then the GRS achieves the global social optimum.
Discussion and Extensions
We have designed a global refunding scheme inducing countries to set emission taxes such as to achieve socially optimal levels of greenhouse gas abatement. Within the formal representation of our model we have shown that, once all countries have joined, the GRS can achieve the global social optimum. Moreover, it is self-enforcing in the sense that no country has an incentive to leave the GRS. However, our formal results rest on a number of strong assumptions, some of which we will discuss in the following.
We also indicate some important avenues for further research.
Alternative GRS Designs
First we discuss particular institutional details of the global refunding system proposed in this paper. We have assumed that the GRS is operated by a central agency acting in the interests of member countries. An equivalent institution would be a body governing the GRS in which each member country has one delegate with one vote and decisions are taken by simple majority rule. As member countries are homogeneous and their interests are thus aligned, majority decisions would yield the same outcomes as delegation to a central authority.
Next, our refunding formula solely depends on relative emission reductions within one particular period. Alternative refunding formulas are conceivable that also utilize past emission reductions data. For instance, a country's refund might solely depend on the proportion of emission reductions it achieves within a given period compared to previous periods. In principle, such a scheme can generate similarly powerful abatement incentives and also yields a self-enforcing property for the GRS. However, the analytical complexity increases substantially as a further intertemporal incentive effect occurs because strong abatement in a particular period increases refund costs in subsequent periods.
In our model, countries can only reduce emissions by levying emission taxes, which implies a one-to-one relationship between emission taxes and emission abatement (see 
Formation of the GRS
We have focused on the capacity of a GRS to induce countries to follow a socially optimal path of abatement. To make the whole system workable, countries have to be motivated to make initial monetary commitments thereby joining the GRS. We start with the observation that a GRS, as developed in this paper, transforms the intertemporal climate policy problem into a standrad static public goods problem.
That is, if all countries make their initial contribution, a first-best allocation is ensured by the GRS. Hence, for motivating countries to make initial payments, we can apply solution procedures that have been developed in the literature on the private supply of public goods. Three types of procedures have been suggested to solve this free-rider problem.
First, the agreement could be cancelled if one country does not sign the commitment.
That is, the GRS will not be established unless all countries participate. It can easily be seen from Propositions 1 and 2 that joining the GRS is more profitable for an individual country than the fully decentralized solution. This procedure relies on the strong assumption that no GRS will be established if some countries deflect. Second, several sequential procedures, where a subset of agents starts and others follow, have been proposed in the literature (Andreoni 1998 , Varian 1994 , Lange 2006 . Third, another avenue to solve the initial participation problem has been initiated by Guttman (1978) , generalized by Danziger and Schnytzer (1991) and extended to an international context by Boadway et al. (2007) . They study a multi-stage game in which players in the first stage announce contributions that are conditional on subsequent contributions of others. In later stages, players choose their actual contributions and fulfill the commitments made in the first stage. Which of these mechanisms is best suited to induce countries to make initial monetary contributions for the GRS is left to future research.
Redistribution within the GRS
In our model we assume completely symmetric countries. In fact, countries differ both in the costs of emission abatement and in the expected damages from climate change.
Most studies indicate that the economic and social impacts of climate change would be distributed very unevenly across the globe. In particular, there is a prospect of large damages to developing countries in the tropics (see, e.g., Tol 2006) . Such countries will not only have higher marginal damages, they also may lack the funds to participate in the GRS. Whether it is possible to design an efficient GRS where all countries participate but only a subset of countries (i.e. "rich" countries) pay an initial fee and are eligible to receive non-refunded funds at the end of the life-time, is another important avenue for further research on narrowing the gap between the theoretical concept and its practical applications.
Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced an alternative international climate change mitigation agreement, the global refunding scheme (GRS), which is a potential candidate for replacing or succeeding existing agreements such as the Kyoto protocol. The basic idea of the GRS is that each country is free to set its carbon emission tax but all tax revenues of member countries are collected in a global fund and partly reimbursed to member countries in proportion to the relative emission reductions they have achieved within a given period.
Within a simple model framework we have shown that the GRS can completely overcome the the free-riding problem involved in the provision of the global public good "mitigation of climate change" and thus implement globally social optimal levels of emission abatement. Moreover, the GRS is self-enforcing in the sense that compliance with the agreement is in the interests of all member countries and therefore does not rely on a supranational body with the power to prosecute infringement of the agree-ment.
However, participation by all countries in the GRS requires initial monetary payments into the fund, a situation analogous to the private provision of public goods. Investigating which of the procedures established in the public good literature is best suited to overcome the initial participation problem and accounting for heterogeneous countries are promising avenues for further research.
Proof of Proposition 2
The set of subgame perfect equilibria is determined by the solution of the set of necessary and sufficient linear conditions (19). In the subgame perfect equilibrium, all countries i set the same emission taxes, as the right hand side of condition (19) is identical across countries. Thus we can reduce (19) to a set of 2 linear equations for the two unknownsτ 1 andτ 2 if we also insert the equation of motion (6) for the stocks of greenhouse gases s t and substitute emissions via equation (4):
As these two equations are linear and independent, there exists a unique solution given by equations (20).
We derive equations (21) for the stocks of greenhouse gases by inserting equations (20) into the equation of motion (6).
Proof of Proposition 3
Let countries i = 1, . . . , m 1 join the GRS in period t = 1, and let countries i = 1, . . . , m 2 ≤ m 1 stay in the GRS in period t = 2. Denote the sum of the emission taxes imposed by non-participating countries in period t by T t . Then the Lagrangian of the optimization problem (22) subject to equations (6), (4), and τ The unique solution is given by equations (23).
We derive equations (25) for the stocks of greenhouse gases by inserting equations (23) into the equation of motion (6).
Proof of Proposition 4
The Lagrangian (30) 
Proof of Proposition 5
According to Proposition 3 the CA's tax goal if m 1 countries participate in the GRS in both periods is given by equations (23) setting m 2 = m 1 . From equations (A.4) and (A.3a) we know that
Following the same line of argument as in Section 4.2, one derives the following necessary condition for all countries i: φτ 2 = φβs 2 + (m 2 − 1)α 2 f 2 m
